Abstract. Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network formation games is proved: for a generic assignment of utilities to networks, the set of probability distributions on networks induced by Nash equilibria is finite.
Introduction
A basic tool in applying noncooperative game theory is to have a finite set of probability distributions on outcomes derived from equilibria.
1 When utilities are defined over the relevant outcome space, it is well know that this is generically the case when we can assign a different outcome to each pure strategy profile (Harsanyi, 1973) , or to each ending node of an extensive form game (Kreps and Wilson, 1982) .
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A game form endows players with finite strategy sets and specifies which is the outcome that arises from each pure strategy profile.
3 It could identify, for instance, two ending nodes of an extensive form game with the same outcome. Govindan and McLennan (2001) give an example of a game form such that, in an open set of utilities over outcomes, produces infinitely many equilibrium distributions on outcomes. In view of such a negative result, we have to turn to specific classes of games to seek for positive results regarding the generic determinacy of the Nash equilibrium concept. For some examples, see Park (1997) for sender-receiver games, and De Sinopoli (2001) and De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni (2005) for voting games.
This paper studies the generic determinacy of the Nash equilibrium concept when individual payoffs depend on the network connecting them. The network literature has been fruitful to describe social and economic interaction. See for instance Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) , Kranton and Minehart (2001) , Jackson and Watts (2002), or Calvo-Armengol (2004) . It is, therefore, important to have theories that explain how such networks form. Different network formation procedures have been proposed. For a comprehensive survey of those theories the reader is referred to Jackson (2005) .
The most natural network formation game was suggested by Myerson (1991) and it can be described as follows. Each player simultaneously proposes a list of players with whom she wants to form a link and a direct link between two players is formed if and only if both players agree on that. Calvo-Armengol anḋ Ilkilic (2007) study this game to provide a connection between pairwise-stability, a network equilibrium concept defined in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) , and proper equilibrium, a noncooperative equilibrium refinement due to Myerson (1978) .
This game is simple and intuitive, however, since it takes two players to form a link, a coordination problem arises which makes the game exhibit multiplicity of equilibria. This fact constitutes a common concern in network theory. Nevertheless, we can prove that even though a network formation game may have a large number of equilibria, generically the set of probability distributions on networks that they induce is finite.
The network formation game is formally presented in the next section. Section 3 discusses an example. Section 4 contains the main result and its proof. To conclude, Section 5 discusses some remarks, extensions of the result to other network formation games and a related result for the extensive form game of network formation introduced by Aumann and Myerson (1989) .
Preliminaries
Given a finite set A, denote as P(A) the power set of A, and as ∆(A) the set of probability distributions on A.
2.1. Networks. Given a set of players N , a network g is a collection of direct links. A direct link in the network g between two different players i and j is denoted by ij ∈ g. For the time being we focus on undirected networks. In an undirected network ij ∈ g is equivalent to ji ∈ g. 4 The set of i's direct links in g is
is directly linked to every other player. The set of all undirected networks on N is G = P(g N ). Each player i can be directly linked with N − 1 other players. The number of links in the complete network g N is N (N − 1)/2, dividing by 2 not to count links twice. Since G is the power set of g N , it has 2 N (N −1)/2 elements.
Game forms.
A game form is given by a set of players N = {1, . . . , n}, nonempty finite sets of pure strategies S 1 , . . . , S n , a finite set of outcomes Ω, a function θ : S → ∆(Ω), and utilities defined over the outcome space Ω, that is, u 1 , . . . , u n : Ω → R. Once we fix N , S 1 , . . . , S n , Ω, and θ, a game form is given by a point in R Ω N .
Utility functions u 1 , . . . , u n over Ω induce utility functions v 1 , . . . , v n over S according to u 1 • θ, . . . , u n • θ. Hence, every game form has associated its finite normal form game.
2.3. The Network Formation Game. The set of players is N . All players in N simultaneously announce the set of direct links they wish to form. Formally, the set of player i's pure strategies is S i = P(N \ {i}). Therefore, a strategy s i ∈ S i is a subset of N \ {i} and is interpreted as the set of players other than i with whom player i wishes to form a link. Mutual consent is needed to create a direct link, i.e., if s is played, ij is created if and only if j ∈ s i and i ∈ s j .
We can adapt the previous general description of game forms to the present context in order to specify the game form that structures the network formation game. Let the set of players and the collection of pure strategy sets be as above. The set of outcomes is the set of undirected networks, i.e., Ω = G. The function θ is a deterministic outcome function, formally, θ : S → G. Given a pure strategy profile, θ specifies which network is formed respecting the rule of mutual consent to create direct links. Utilities are functions u 1 , . . . , u n : G → R. Once the set of players N is given, the pure strategy sets are automatically created and the network formation game is defined by a point in R G N . If players other than i play according to s −i ∈ S −i , 5 the utility to player i from playing strategy s i is equal to
Let Σ i = ∆(S i ) be the set of mixed strategies of player i. Furthermore, let Σ = Σ 1 × · · · × Σ n . While a pure strategy profile s results in the network θ(s) with certainty, a mixed strategy profile σ generates a probability distribution on G, where the probability that g ∈ G forms equals
If players other than i play according to σ −i in Σ −i , 6 the utility to player i from playing the mixed strategy σ i is equal to
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium). The strategy profile σ ∈ Σ is a Nash equilibrium of the network formation game if (2001) give an example of a game form that, in an open set of utilities over outcomes, produces infinitely many equilibrium distributions on the outcome space.
Govindan and McLennan
7 Nevertheless, they also provide a number of positive results. Consider the general specification of game forms given in Section 2.2. The following theorem is a modification of Theorem 5.3 in Govindan and McLennan (2001) .
Their counterexample needs at least three players. In a recent paper, Kukushkin et al. (2008) provide a counterexample for the two player case.
8 The reason why we need such a modification is given in Section 5.4.
Theorem 1.
If θ is such that at all completely mixed strategy tuples and for each agent i the set of distributions on Ω that agent i can induce by changing her strategy is (|S i |−1)-dimensional, then for generic utilities there are finitely many completely mixed equilibria.
The proof of Theorem 1 is offered in the appendix.
An Example
Consider a 3 person network formation game. The corresponding game form is depicted in Figure 1 . Player 1 is the row player, player 2 the column player, and player 3 the matrix player. The symbol g 0 denotes the empty network, g N denotes the complete network, g ij denotes the network that only contains link ij, and g i denotes the network where player i is connected to every other player and such that there are no further links. Suppose that the utility function of player i = 1, 2 is u i (g) = |L i (g)|, i.e. player i = 1, 2 derives an utility from network g equal to the number of direct links that she maintains in g. Suppose also that player 3 has the same utility as players 1 and 2, except that she derives an utility equal to 2 from network g 2 . Specifically,
Figure 2 displays the set of Nash equilibria of this game. The subset of Nash equilibria of line (i) supports the empty network, the subsets of line (ii) support, respectively, networks g 12 , g 13 and g 23 , the subsets of line (iii) support, respectively, networks g 1 , g 2 and g 3 . Figure 2 . Set of Nash equilibria of the 3 person network formation game discussed in Section 3.
The subset of equilibria of line (iv) induces a continuum of probability distribution over the set of networks that give probability λ to network g 2 and probability (1 − λ) to the complete network g N for λ ∈ [0, 1]. Now perturb independently the utility that each player obtains from each network. The subsets of strategy profiles of lines (i) through (iii) are still equilibrium strategy profiles. In addition, there are two possibilities:
• Player 3 ranks the complete network g N over network g 2 . In this case the set of Nash equilibria is composed of lines (i) through (iii) united to ({2, 3}, {1, 3}, {1, 2}) , which supports the complete network.
• Player 3 ranks network g 2 over the complete network g N . Then, no Nash equilibrium gives positive probability to the complete network. The set of Nash equilibria is composed of lines (i) through (iii) united to (λ{2} + (1 − λ){2, 3}, {1, 3}, {2}) : λ ∈ [0, 1) , which supports network g 2 .
In either case, there is a finite number of probability distributions on networks induced by equilibria.
The Result
The discussion of the case where player 3 ranks network g 2 over the complete network illustrates that we cannot hope for generic finiteness of equilibrium points in network formation games. A direct application of Theorem 1 tells us that there is a finite set of completely mixed equilibrium points, but it leaves open the possibility that there be a continuum of equilibria in which some pure strategy of some player remains unused.
The following proof truncates the network formation game into smaller games in which some strategies are not available, and in which every link proposal meets a positive response if the counterpart of the link plays a completely mixed strategy. Each of these smaller games has a finite number of completely mixed equilibria. The desired result comes from the fact that every equilibrium of a truncated game that does not belong to the previous family induces the same probability distribution on networks as some equilibrium of some game that does belong to such a family.
Proposition. For generic u ∈ R
G N the set of probability distributions on networks induced by Nash equilibria of the network formation game is finite.
Proof. Given a network formation game, there are a finite number of different normal form games obtained by assigning to each player i an element of P(S i ) as her strategy set.
Let T = T 1 × · · · × T n , where T i ⊆ S i . The normal form game Γ T is defined by the set of players N , the collection of strategy sets {T i } i∈N , and the collection of utility functions {v
It is enough to prove that for a generic assignment of payoffs to networks, completely mixed Nash equilibria of each of those games induce a finite set of probability distributions on G. Notice that every equilibrium of any game can be obtained as a completely mixed equilibrium of the modified game obtained by eliminating unused strategies.
Consider the game Γ T . If there exists a strategy t i ∈ T i with j ∈ t i and there does not exist a strategy t j ∈ T j such that i ∈ t j , replace strategy t i with t
is not already contained in T i , otherwise just eliminate strategy t i from T i . Notice that by making this change, the set of probability distributions on G T that can be obtained through mixed strategies remains unaltered. Most importantly, for every completely mixed Nash equilibrium of Γ T , there exists a completely mixed Nash equilibrium of the modified game that induces the same probability distribution on G T .
Repeat the same procedure with t ′ i : if there exists a k ∈ t ′ i and there does not exist a strategy t k in T k with i ∈ t k substitute t
is not already contained in T k . Continue eliminating and replacing pure strategies in the same vein, for every t i in T i and for every i in N , until every link proposal that any player has in some on her strategies is formed with positive probability under a completely mixed strategy profile. LetT denote the resulting set of pure strategy profiles, and notice that GT = G T .
At every completely mixed strategy profile σ of ΓT , every network in G T receives positive probability. At the strategy profile (t i , σ −i ), only those networks g ∈ G T such that {ij : j ∈ t i } ⊂ g and {ij : j / ∈ t i } ∩ g = ∅ are possible. Since for every player i each of her pure strategies means a different set of proposed links, we have that:
Therefore, at every completely mixed strategy profile of ΓT the set probability distributions on G T that player i can induce by varying her strategy is (|T i | − 1)-dimensional. We can apply Theorem 1 to the game form given byT and θT , the restriction of θ toT . This implies that for generic utilities over G T there are finitely many completely mixed equilibria of ΓT , which in turn implies that the set of probability distributions on G T induced by completely mixed Nash equilibria of Γ T is generically finite.
Let T ⊆ S, we can write R G N = R GT N × R G\GT N . Let K be a closed set of zero measure in R GT N , i.e., the closure of the set of payoffs over G T such that the set of completely mixed Nash equilibria of Γ T induces infinitely many probability distributions on G T , then for any closed set H in R G\GT N the closed set K × H has zero measure in R G N . The same is true for any other T ′ ⊆ S. This concludes the proof.
Remarks
5.1. Absence of Mutual Consent. Models of network formation can be found in the literature that do not require common agreement between the parties to create a direct link, see for instance Bala and Goyal (2000) . Thus, suppose that mutual consent is not needed to create a direct link. Let N be the set of players, let S 1 , . . . , S n be the collection of pure strategy sets, where S i = P(N \ {i}) for all i in N , and let G be the outcome space. In the model analyzed in Section 4, a link may not be created even if a player wants it to be created. In the current model, a link may be created even if a player does not want it to be created.
In this modified network formation game, generically, the set of equilibrium distributions on G is also finite. Notice that we can reinterpret pure strategies s i ∈ S i as the set of players other that i with whom player i does not want to form a link. The link ij is not created only if player i does not want to be linked with player j and player j does not want to be linked with player i. Define
, where θ is as defined in Section 2.3. Now, apply the proof of Section 4.
5.2. Directed Networks. Sometimes links ij and ji cannot be treated as equivalent for reasons coming from the nature of the phenomena being modeled. Directed networks respond to this necessity.
Denote the set of directed networks as G d . Suppose first that link formation does not need mutual consent. The strategy set of player i is S i = P(N \ {i}). A strategy s i ∈ S i is interpreted as the set of players other than i with whom player i wants to start an arrowhead link pointing at herself, i.e. the set of links that player i wishes to receive.
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Notice that each pure strategy profile leads to a different element in G d : each player has 2 N −1 pure strategies, and there are 2 N (N −1) undirected networks. Therefore, we are in the case of normal form payoffs where the generic finiteness of equilibria is guaranteed.
Suppose now that if a player i wants to receive a link from player j, player j needs to declare that she wants to send a link to player i for it to be created. To accommodate for this case, let the strategy set of player i be S i = S r i × S A similar proof to the one used in Section 4 establishes the generic determinacy of the Nash equilibrium concept under this setting. The key step that we must change is the following: Let T = T 1 × · · · × T n where T i ⊂ S i for all i. Consider the normal form game Γ T . If there exists a strategy t i ∈ T i such that j ∈ t r i (such that j ∈ t s i ) and there does not exist a strategy t j ∈ T j such that i ∈ t s j (such that i ∈ t r j ), replace strategy t i with t repeat the same procedure for every t i , t ′ i , . . . and for every i until the hypothesis of Theorem 1 holds.
5.
3. An Extensive Form Game of Network Formation. We have focused on normal form games of network formation. However, there exists a prominent extensive game of network formation due to Aumann and Myerson (1989) . They proposed the first explicit formalization of network formation as a game. It relies on an exogenously given order over possible links. Let (i 1 j 1 , . . . , i m j m ) be such a ranking.
The game has m stages. In the first stage players i 1 and j 1 play a simultaneous move game to decide whether or not they form link i 1 j 1 . Each of them chooses an action from the set {yes, not}. The link i 1 j 1 is established if and only if both players choose yes. Once the decision on link i 1 j 1 is taken, every player gets informed about it, and the play of the game moves to the decision about link i 2 j 2 . The game evolves in the same fashion, and finishes with the stage where players i m and j m decide upon link i m j m .
11 The resulting network is formed by the set links i k j k such that both players i k and j k chose yes at stage k. Although in the argument we work with undirected networks, the game can be applied to the formation of directed networks.
The argument that follows is a modification of the one used by Govindan and McLennan (2001) to prove that, for a given assignment of outcomes to ending nodes in an extensive game of perfect information, and for utilities such that no player is indifferent between two different outcomes, every Nash equilibrium induces a degenerate probability distribution in the set of outcomes. Such an argument is, in turn, a generalization of the one used by Kuhn (1953) to prove his "backwards induction" theorem that characterizes subgame perfect equilibria for games of perfect information.
Consider the generic set of utilities
The claim is that if the utility vector is u ∈ U G , every Nash equilibrium induces a probability distribution on G that assigns probability one to some g ∈ G.
Let S i denote the set of pure strategies of player i, where now a pure strategy is a function that assigns one element of {yes, not} to each information set of player i. As usual, Σ i = ∆(S i ) and Σ = Σ 1 × · · · × Σ n .
Let σ ∈ Σ be a Nash equilibrium for u ∈ U G . The appropriate modification of σ, sayσ, is a completely mixed Nash equilibrium of the extensive form game obtained by eliminating all information sets and branches that occur with zero probability in case σ is played. In this reduced game, every information set has a well defined conditional probability over networks and, obviously,σ induces the same probability distribution on G as σ.
If there is a stage where a player randomizes between yes and not and the other player does chooses yes with positive probability 1, there must be a last such stage.
11 If players get informed about which has been the terminal position in the simultaneous move game of every stage, the same argument offered below also goes through.
Several features can be added to this basic model. For instance, two players can be called to reconsider their decision in case some set of links is formed, or two player may not be allowed to decide upon the link connecting them. At this respect, if players are forming an undirected network, m can be different from 2
But at this last stage, say i h j h , such an agent, say i h , cannot be optimizing, since she is not indifferent between g \ {i h j h } and g ∪ {i h j h } for any g ∈ G.
We can adapt the previous argument to the case where mutual consent is not needed to create a link. Let (i 1 j 1 , . . . , i m j m ) be an oder of links. At stage k, player i k decides whether or not to create link i k j k . Her decision becomes publicly known. It is, consequently, a game of perfect information and the argument given by Govindan and McLennan (2001) covers this case.
Maximal Dimension Points.
A maximal dimension point is a strategy vector such that, for every player, equation 4.1 is equal to the number of elements of her pure strategy set minus one.
Theorem 5.3 in Govindan and McLennan (2001) generalizes Harsanyi's result to game forms where every strategy vector is a maximal dimension point. However, as they notice, "in order for every strategy vector to be a maximal dimension point, the game form cannot identify two pure strategy vectors with the same outcome if they specify different pure strategies for only one agent." In a network formation game many pure strategy profiles that only differ in the strategy of one agent can be assigned the same network (see Figure 1) .
Theorem 1 states that it is enough that every completely mixed strategy vectors be a maximal dimension point to obtain a finite number of completely mixed equilibria.
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1
The current proof is based on the proof of Theorem 5.3 in Govindan and McLennan (2001) . It exploits the semi-algebraic structure of the Nash equilibrium correspondence. We will closely follow their exposition of semi-algebraic geometry. Other expositions of the subject in the economic literature can be found in Blume and Zame (1994) and Schanuel et al. (1991) . Proofs of major results are omitted.
Definition 3.
A set A is semi-algebraic if it is the finite union of sets of the form x ∈ R m : P (x) = 0 and Q 1 (x) > 0 and. . . and Q k (x) > 0 where P and Q 1 , . . . , Q k are polynomials in x 1 , . . . , x m with real coefficients. A function (or correspondence) g : A → B with semi-algebraic domain A ⊂ R n and range B ⊂ R m is semi-algebraic if its graph is a semi-algebraic subset of R n+m .
Each semi-algebraic set is the finite union of connected components. Each component is a semi-algebraic manifold of a given dimension. A d-dimensional semi-algebraic manifold in R m is a semi-algebraic set M ⊂ R m such that for each p ∈ M there exist polynomials P 1 , . . . , P m−d and U , a neighborhood of p, such that DP 1 (p), . . . , DP m−d (p) are linearly independent and M ∩ U = q ∈ U : P 1 (q) = . . . = P m−d (q) = 0 .
Theorem 2 (Stratification, Whitney (1957) , Bochnak et al. (1987, 9.1.8) ). If A is a semi-algebraic set, then A is the union of a finite number of disjoint, connected semi-algebraic manifolds A l with A l ⊂ cl(A k ) whenever A l ∩ cl(A k ) = ∅.
Henceforth, superscripts index members of a decomposition, while subscripts keep indexing players. Theorem 2 has important consequences. Among those, we will use the following intuitive ones: Let A ⊂ R m and B ⊂ R n be semi-algebraic sets, then
• the dimension of A, dim A, is equal to the largest dimension of any element of any stratification, • if A is 0-dimensional then A is finite, • A is generic if and only if dim(R m \ A) < m, • dim(A × B) = dim A + dim B.
We need one additional result. While Theorem 2 decomposes semi-algebraic sets, the following one decomposes semi-algebraic functions.
